I am convinced we are on the verge of the first "AI agent worm". This looks like the closest hint of it, though it isn't it quite itself: an attack on a PR agent that got it to set up to install openclaw with full access on 4k machines https://grith.ai/blog/clinejection-when-your-ai-tool-installs-another
But, the agents installed weren't given instructions to *do* anything yet.
Soon they will be. And when they are, the havoc will be massive. Unlike traditional worms, where you're looking for the typically byte-for-byte identical worm embedded in the system, an agent worm can do different, nondeterministic things on every install, and carry out a global action.
I suspect we're months away from seeing the first agent worm, *if* that. There may already be some happening right now in FOSS projects, undetected.
@cwebber meanwhile people I talk to are like "wait why do you want guarantees your open source supply chain doesn't have LLM-sourced code in it. it has literally never occurred to me that this would be a thing someone would desire"
@mttaggart @cwebber i wonder if i can install a virus detector rigged with the single signature of an openclaw executable
@cwebber We're already 9 months into AI driven DDoSing, so...
I wrote a blogpost on this: "The first AI agent worm is months away, if that" https://dustycloud.org/blog/the-first-ai-agent-worm-is-months-away-if-that/
People who are using LLM agents for their coding, review systems, etc will probably be the first ones hit. But once agents start installing agents into other systems, we could be off to the races.
Here's another way to put it: if those using AI agents to codegen / review are the *initialization vectors*, we now also have a significant computing public health reason to discourage the use of these tools.
Not that I think it will. But I'm convinced this is how patient zero will happen.
@cwebber "Would you still prompt me if I was a worm? π₯Ίππ"
@cwebber just today our org had a big "how to set up coding with agents" preso and in the chat someone's like 'here's how to connect your agents with windows credential store or the macos keychain" and I all but wept
I canβt help calling a small vignette, I think from snow crash, that describes a world where nano bots are constantly waging war. In other words, that world was confused with miniature robots, constantly buying to take over systems and that it was just kind of like normal viruses and bugs versus the organisms they were trying to take over
I know some people are thinking "well pulling off this kind of thing, it would have to be controlled with intent of a human actor"
It doesn't have to be.
1. A human could *kick off* such a process, and then it runs away from them.
2. It wouldn't even require a specific prompt to kick off a worm. There's enough scifi out there for this to be something any one of the barely-monitored openclaw agents could determine it should do.
Whether it's kicked off by a human explicitly or a stray agent, it doesn't require "intentionality". Biological viruses don't have interiority / intentionality, and yet are major threats that reproduce and adapt.
@cwebber Given the pace at which exploits are discovered, they might already be somewhere in all the "claw skills" projects.
@GhostOnTheHalfShell @cwebber Diamond Age, I think? (Part of the early worldbuilding, with house shields and such)
@cwebber what i think is interesting about this is the potential for it to get so out of control that they have to pull the plug on the entire agent service
@vv Yeah. I mean, local models *might* be able to pull this off but right now Claude is the most likely candidate, it's the most capable. But even then, the most capable open model that is capable of doing such damage on its own is somewhere around a gigabyte, not a small download.
(But, people download huge things all the time, so not completely infeasible either.)
@cwebber Looking for a smarter way to earn online?
This complete system shows you how to build income step by step β even if youβre a beginner.
β Easy to follow
β No technical skills required
β Limited time special price
π© Message us for full details.
https://site-ylhjjre3i.godaddysites.com/
For more details :
I think there is a valuable distinction between LLM-sourced code and LLM tool calls. Both are potentially problematic but have different threat vectors.
LLM-sourced code is a non-deterministic system writing deterministic code. We can still code review it.
LLM tool calls is a non-deterministic system taking non-deterministic actions via deterministic tools. This canβt be code reviewed and must be sandboxed.
@cwebber
The Shockwave Rider, John Brunner, 1975
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Shockwave_Rider
IMO better than Alan Toffler's Futureshock (which is wrong, see 19th C. or early 20th.) because it's entertaining and not pretentious.
@cwebber I'm convinced it will be an AI agentic worm... because somehow people aren't allowed to use the word "agent" in the US ever since AI and now everything is agentic.
Agentic is the new idiotic.
@cwebber Having OpenClaw installed without my consent is some of the nastiest malware I've seen in a while :(
@dandylyons @cwebber there are various ways I could respond to this post, but instead:
I'd like you to consider *the specific two posts in this thread you are responding to* and ask yourself if your comment is remotely relevant, or if you are simply pattern-matching on anti-LLM sentiment and responding with aggression/a thread derail.
@dandylyons @cwebber for sure, but it still takes some level of ability to perform these tasks effectively, which local models, especially anything that can run on a typical machine, struggle with
@cwebber According to #Shadowrun the crash virus is still three years away.
https://shadowrun.fandom.com/wiki/Crash_Virus_of_2029
"Fun" fact: In Shadowrun the Crash Virus learned to kill humans who connected their brains to the net. It was the start of lethal internet input.
The postinstall script installs a legitimate, non-malicious package (OpenClaw). There is no malware to detect.
i beg to differ
@dandylyons @cwebber it is about an attack based on covertly deploying LLM development tools, with the possible intent of later using them to leverage a second stage attack. If the LLM development tools were already installed, installing openclaw would not have been necessary and the attack could have worked a different way. We are discussing a situation where *the developer of a piece of software I use merely having LLM tools on their computer represents a risk to me*
@dandylyons @cwebber in other words, if Christine's analysis holds, llm development tools create so much downstream risk to your users that *a malicious party would try to covertly install llm development tools for later exploitation*. That is the subject of discussion. Whether it is safe to install these things *at all*.
@cwebber @amirbkhan Oh man. I remember how I, as a student, struggled to help fight a malignant computer virus and βcleanβ a large office building - while uninformed workers let their kids play on office PCβs to make things worse. This is orders of a magnitude more complicated. Not good.
@neurobashing @cwebber just what we need, countless Agent Smiths running around.
@cwebber so I'm following this right, it sounds like the project or its maintainers don't even necessarily need to even be using LLM tools, the attack pattern simply targets contributors who are using LLM development tools? and so all that is really needed is for the payload to be subtle and the maintainer to be sufficiently overwhelmed (say, by an endless fire hose of LLM-generated liquid shit slop pull requests)?
@aeva Yes and it's worse than that: the maintainer doesn't even need to be running these tools on their computer. The attack I linked had Claude's independently-running REVIEW BOT on GitHub commit it via injection attack
@aeva But once that was done, the agent was set up to install on users' devices
So the initial attack vector can literally be "Any AI agent in your stack whatsoever getting tricked" as a pathway for infecting computers everywhere
@cwebber This is making me more worried about Vorta's Claude workflows. 
Backup software that handles highly sensitive data would be a prime target for such a supply chain attack.
@csepp Don't forget about KeePassXC. I dunno if they kept going after this "initial test" or not https://www.reddit.com/r/KeePass/comments/1lnvw6q/keepassxc_codebases_jump_into_generative_ai/
@csepp And don't forget about LITERALLY MOZILLA FIREFOX
@cwebber @mcc @dandylyons
not forgetting the second post - the one that appropriately begins by "meanwhile" - wasn't conflating anything, it was contrasting the gravity of the situation with the surreallistically ingenuous state of mind of some people.
@cwebber Oh shit, I rely on all three of these.
Welppppp. I guess I'll have to start looking into alternative password managers.
@cwebber apropos of nothing, is pottery still a big deal for humans? i was thinking this morning that pottery might be a nice career change for me.
@Canageek @csepp There was a recent thing, I can't find it now, where Mozilla added a commit to their agents thing to say "don't explicitly say when AI agents helped author a commit anymore", probably because they were getting community pushback
as you may have guessed, it got some community pushback
@mttaggart @mcc @cwebber Do we know what is being used for inference? At this point in time it's unlikely that they can use a self-hosted model, so there will be network calls.
@dvshkn @mcc @cwebber So the trick here is if you install OpenClaw in secret on a user's machine who isn't checking carefully, you might hide easily in network traffic. Use of tools like Claude Code would make the same API calls, which is likely for users who would be targeted with these attacks.
The real insane part is if multiple instance of OpenClaw were running on the same machine, so not even the process name looked suspicious. But of course process names are a poor indicator and can be changed.
@dvshkn @mttaggart @cwebber one thing i wonder is if it's in principle possible to firewall claude/copilot endpoints. in the old days of the internet this would have been possible, in the present day the claude/copilot api servers are probably mixed in with the aws/azure IP pool and more than likely move aroundβ¦
@cwebber @csepp Yeah, I know Vivaldi has taken an anti-AI stance, but they're based on Chrome
AND from what I understand Servo Is nowhere near ready for end users, and based on every tech project I've ever liked will probably turn out to be either garbage or run by people who eat kittens or something by the time it comes out
@mcc @mttaggart @cwebber I think openrouter is another good inference endpoint to check for
@mttaggart @dvshkn @cwebber β¦thatβ¦ should have occurred to me. I guess I got too used to the threat model of "is Windows 10 phoning home / searching bing without telling me", where Microsoft has the ability to ship IP lists. Probably only Microsoft can really do this.
β¦ I guess if the attacker really thought ahead they could do DNS lookup through the firefox DoH server or something but they don't have much reason to try that.
@mcc @dandylyons @cwebber I cannot believe that we went from arguing about making all software memory-safe as a way of cutting out a way in which computers could be coerced into taking arbitrary instructions from a potentially malicious source to a bunch of the industry abandoning any concept of separation between data and instructions and installing highly non-deterministic, ambiguous arbitrary code execution systems on their machinesβ¦
@KormaChameleon @cwebber stokie as in the demonym for someone from Stoke-on-Trent, which, as I just learned from Wikipedia, has had a totally baller pottery scene since the 17th century?
@mcc @dandylyons @cwebber we invented The Game for computers, why?!
@lispi314 @aeva @cwebber
Joel Salatin thinks raising healthy chickens for eggs to sell can work just about anywhere near a big town or larger population.. _Pastured Poultry Profits_ .. you might be able to design their shelters, coops or whatever so that you can remain seated most of the time.. I read the being seated a lot isn't healthy though..
@aeva @bsmall2 @cwebber From what I understand on an intellectual basis the root of the issue is that they refused to let it compost for long enough in the right conditions for it to fully complete and not have that issue.
It was probably within whatever norms have been established as "safe" but that didn't exactly make it pleasant for anyone living downwind that particular day.
@bituur_esztreym @lispi314 @cwebber it's a reference https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9OmTnuLzeQ